

Just Finance International **ANNUAL REPORT** 2022



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
Annual report 2022

June 2023

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Selected media coverage of our work in 2022



Mission

Just Finance International works to ensure that development and infrastructure finance globallyboth public and private financing-is contributing to the advancement of climate and environmental justice and human rights.

We conduct in-depth research on financial flows and advocate for transparency and accountability in the investment decisions of public financial and development institutions, while finding ways to stimulate and support cross-border collaboration.

The climate emergency and the alarming loss of the planet's biodiversity are closely related to ill-conceived, large-scale infrastructure projects financed with public money. These include power plants that will generate greenhouse gas emissions for decades to come, large hydropower dams, mining projects and export corridors that slice through some of the world's few remaining wild areas and intact forests.

In addition to the global environmental repercussions, there are often severe impacts on local communities who are affected by pollution, forced resettlement and loss of livelihood.

We make it our mission to support affected communities, whose rights, livelihoods and access to decision-making processes have been impeded by these investments.





Letter from the director

Thanks to the tremendous support of our donors and our longstanding partners across the world—in particular VedvarendeEnergi, a Danish organization that has hosted the Just Finance program since 2019—Just Finance International became incorporated in late 2021. This marked 2022 as the first full year of Just Finance International's operations.

Right from launch, we knew our work must be anchored in amplifying the voices and effort of the affected local populations, whose ecosystem and way of life have been harmed by ill-conceived investment decisions at the level of international development financing. We began with the conviction that one way of addressing the significant governance gaps in these mega-projects would be to capture and document their foreseeable and often irreversible impacts on the local ecosystem, as well as undertake research and analysis to enable more informed decision-making and more effective advocacy-both at the project and policy level.

Unfortunately, the reality in many of the borrowing countries involved in development finance funding and, in particular, the Belt and Road Initiative revealed a grim picture. We observed the widening gap between what our European governments have committed to achieve through development-based lending, and a worsening "race-to-the-bottom" trend of skirting the very standards and regulations that they have helped to codify in the past two decades.

Throughout the year, our organization actively engaged with shareholding governments of development finance institutions, working group on sustainable finance, climate diplomats, as well as experts across the human rights, governance and energy fields. We advocated for them to uphold crucial standards and principles, ranging from the rights of indigenous peoples, climate finance commitments, transparency, to rule of law. We prioritized this strategy because, broadly speaking, the field of international financing attends more readily to interventions that should advance the regulatory framework in the host countries of these investments and projects.

In addition to our advocacy efforts with governments, we continued to serve as a reliable source of critical and credible analysis for decision-makers interested in the intersection of climate and environmental justice, governance, and human rights issues associated with global investments and multilateral development banks, including those from China.

Our briefings, which encompassed field research findings, investigations into corporate environmental and social governance practices, and analyses of China's policy statements regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and climate-related matters, were incorporated into parliamentary discussions held by members of the European parliaments and cabinets of certain governments.

But most importantly, 2022 was a year we invested much of our time and energy in helping to strengthen the resilience of our partners and the communities in the Global South, whose voices we pledged to elevate. We salute them.


Our impact in 2022

Development finance operates with the aspirational objective to benefit communities, the climate, and the environment. Yet in practice, it can often—unwittingly or otherwise—serve as a facilitator for destructive activities.

When public money flows into ill-conceived large-scale infrastructure projects—such as fossil-fuel-powered plants, hydro-power dams, mining endeavors, and export corridors that cut through vital natural areas—these financing channels not only fail to meet their intended purpose but may tread on the basic human rights of local populations and exacerbate the world's climate emergency.

To address these issues, Just Finance International strives to ensure that government-mandated finance and the circulation of international lending are held to global standards of climate and ecological justice while protecting the rights of resource-dependent communities.

We closely monitor policy developments at the multilateral, European Union, and country-level, as well as the environmental and social governance practices of specific development financial institutions and export credit agencies. We also conduct investigative research to better understand and provide insight on topics like the governance practices around particular foreign direct investment flows. Our goal is to help leaders and policymakers within parliaments, institutions, development banks, and inter-governmental institutions as well as convention bodies make more informed decisions related to financial transparency and environmental governance.



I. Fossil-fuel free finance

The global climate emergency urgently requires financing for climate solutions, yet state-mandated institutions and companies continue to bankroll coal, oil and gas investments. Despite international commitments to phase out the exploration and construction of coal power plants, companies and banks are still enabling the expansion of coal industry, which remains the world's most carbon-intensive and polluting energy source.

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that if the Paris climate goals are to be achieved, all untouched fossils must stay in the ground, and that all state subsidies for extraction and export must be stopped. Just Finance International calls on governments and financial institutions to take the lead in ending the financing of fossil fuels by export credit agencies and development finance institutions.



The expanding Drmno coal mine is impacting the population and land use in Kostolac village. Photo: Nemanja Pančić for Just Finance International (2022)

China's global coal phaseout


In late 2021, the world's largest economies, the G2O, committed to the stopping of financing coal plants abroad, in a continuation of the policy shift achieved at the Export Credit Group in the OECD. Just Finance International worked with frontrunner governments, their climate envoys and partner organizations across Europe and overseas to prompt the climate diplomacy efforts towards this eventual coal "exit". We did so by investigating under-reported and under-regulated coal finance data and involving people's elected representatives to hold the richest European countries and China, which sits outside the OECD, to account.

China's commitment to cease the construction of new coal-fired power plants outside its borders—initially declared at the UN General Assembly in September 2021 and reaffirmed during an EU-China climate dialogue in October 2021—generated widespread initial optimism. As the largest public financier of overseas coal-fired power plants, China stands to play a significant role in global emissions reduction. However, such ambitious promises require tangible follow-through if they are to be more than window dressing.

Half a year after announcing its commitments, relevant government ministries continued to present mixed and contradictory messaging. In a March 2022 joint paper on China's Belt and Road initiative, the country's influential National Development and Reform Commission said that China would "completely stop the construction of overseas coal power projects," before, in another section of the report, stating that it would "steadily promote overseas coal power projects under construction."

Once operational, coal power plants emit greenhouse gases for several decades. Immediate and thorough steps to halt the progress of plant construction are therefore essential. Yet in this realm of concrete action, the dearth of information about China's rollback in overseas coal projects remains a significant concern. Analyzing open-source data and contracts for these projects, JFI helped shed light on this opacity by reporting that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), despite the public pledges from Beijing, participated in at least 67 coal deals in 2021, with a contracted value of \$18 billion USD.

JFI's data generated important debates over the Balkan and Indonesian coal fleets supported by Chinese financing and construction within international media. Such analyses, grounded in real-world developments, will be crucial in holding China accountable to its own stated objectives.



East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline Pipeline

The construction of the world's longest heated crude oil pipeline, spanning from Uganda's remote Lake Albert to Tanzania's shoreline, is posing a threat to the livelihoods of numerous families. Once operational, the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), managed by a consortium consisting of the governments of Uganda and Tanzania, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation and France's TotalEnergies, is expected to transport approximately 246,000 barrels of oil per day.

But the ongoing land acquisition and development process has created widespread unrest and anxiety in communities along the pipeline route where land has been involuntarily acquired. The European Parliament estimated that more than 100,000 people in Tanzania and Uganda are at imminent risk of displacement because of the pipeline. The Parliament also expressed concerns that many of the affected people will not receive proper guarantees of adequate compensation from the project developers.

JFI and partners have undertaken in-depth research and investigations tracing the route of the proposed pipeline, collecting valuable testimonies from affected villagers where there has been a dearth of access and reporting about the experience on the ground. We learned that the project's contractors have not paid inadequate compensation to displaced families, disrupted livelihoods, put elderly and disabled peoples at greater risk, and widened gender imbalances. We also uncovered evidence that the pipeline's contractors, CNOOC and TotalEnergies, are harming biodiversity and livelihoods in the area—despite protection of the environment and biodiversity described as a key element in the project's planning. In November 2022, we signed a letter to European lawmakers calling for the ceasing of deals to expand gas production and infrastructure in Africa.



EACOP affected community in Rakai district together with the village alderman in front. Photo: Just Finance International (2022)

II. Accountable development finance

Financing from development finance institutions (DFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs) often leads to big-ticket and large-scale infrastructure projects, which are, by definition, high risk.

Development finance-mandated projects, when not well-planned or in consultation with communities, can cause loss of livelihoods and involuntary resettlement, as well as the loss of people's voices and their right to participation in decision-making. In many cases, they also compound human-rights violations and accelerate debilitating poverty.

Just Finance International worked to ensure that shareholding governments and development institutions – DFIs and MDBs – improved their governance systems and adopted stronger, more binding environmental and social safeguard policies, rather than defaulting to the use of weaker standards that may prove more attractive to their clients or client host governments.

Holding the Asian Development Bank to Account

In late 2021, the Asian Development Bank pledged to reduce direct and indirect fossil-fuel financing, but did not make a similar commitment for gas. The ADB is the financier of Indonesia's Jawa 1 Liquefied Natural Gas-to Power plant, a 1760 MW gas project and the largest gas project in Indonesia.

Five years into project implementation, local farming and fishing communities continue to suffer the impacts of the project through harmful effects on the coastal environment, the loss of income and livelihoods as a result of land acquisition, and the destruction of fishing grounds. Together with the Indonesia-based Coalition for Monitoring Infrastructure Development (KPPII), we conducted field visits to record the experiences and impacts felt by the communities throughout 2022. Their testimonies have largely been omitted or erased from the positive spins of the project implementing government and the ADB.

2022 also marked an important watershed moment in deterring the further weaking of ADB's standards when investing in Indonesia. Together with the KPPII, we successfully challenged ADB's 6-year long attempt to use the Country Safeguard System (CSS) for Indonesia's electricity parastatal company, the PLN. We pushed for greater transparency and disclosure of due diligence assessments related to coal projects across Indonesia, and pushed back on the bank's attempt to soften its own safeguards to the far weaker environmental and social protections used by the PLN's own corporate/country system, preventing the ADB from backsliding into a lower "new normal" for all of its future funded projects in Indonesia's coal-heavy electricity sector. This extended to the first-ever analysis of the gaps in environmental and social standards between ADB's own safeguard policies – the Safeguard Policy Statement - and Indonesia's newly adopted omnibus law.




Holding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to Account

The Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) opened for business in 2016 and rapidly became a major actor in global finance. By the end of 2020, the AIIB counted 102 approved member countries. The participation of Europe's largest economies as founding members of the AIIB was critical to the AIIB obtaining a triple-A credit rating from the world's leading rating agencies. With the support of Germany's Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Just Finance International co-authored an analysis with Dr. Korinna Horta, 'The Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Global Leader in Infrastructure, at What Cost?'

China's President, Xi Jinping, referred to the AIIB as a new type of professional, efficient, and clean multilateral development bank (MDB). He had proposed the establishment of both the AIIB and China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the same year and for the same purpose. However, in its early years, the AIIB sought to clearly demarcate itself from the BRI. This is no longer the case. The AIIB now refers to the natural complementarity between the two.

Our paper examined the role AIIB plays in China's efforts to shape a new form of multilateralism in which it defines the rules. In the study we analysed the AIIB's policy provisions on transparency and disclosure as the institution positions itself to enter a dynamic growth phase, as well as emblematic investments such as AIIB's first standalone project in Indonesia, the Mandalika Urban Development and Tourism Project, which we will describe at greater length below.



The Mandalika urban development and tourism project

Located on Indonesia's Lombok Island, the Mandalika Urban Development and Tourism project has been dogged by mismanagement and human rights abuses since inception. Designated as a "Special Economic Zone" by the Indonesian government in 2017, the project aims to transform the area into a tourist destination with parks, resorts, and luxury hotels. Its main draw is the Mandalika International Street Circuit, a state-of-the-art, 18-turn motorcycle track on the Grand Prix race circuit designed to host Formula One racing. Leading implementation is the Indonesian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) with significant financial support from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Yet despite being the AIIB's first standalone project in Indonesia, an early environmental and social due diligence assessment failed to address crucial factors protecting the lands rights of the area's Indigenous People. Further, land grabbing and forced displacement had been taking place in Mandalika prior to the AIIB's formal approval of the project, and has only accelerated since construction began.

Together with the Indonesia-based Coalition for Monitoring Infrastructure Development (KPPII), comprising of communitybased organizations in Mandalika and across Lombok, as well as Indonesia's leading environmental and human rights organizations, JFI supported community outreach, project monitoring and investigations, culminating in our August 2022 report detailing the extent to which Indonesian security forces are deployed to threaten and coerce Mandalika's indigenous communities. Our support for these communities and a local coalition of villagers and NGOs has been multifaceted and enduring. Coalition efforts were instrumental in getting the AIIB to issue an "Anti-Retaliation Statement" in the summer of 2022. Yet the statement has proven to be more rhetoric than substance, as reports of intimidation and coercion have continued through this year.

The UN Human Rights (Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights) and its independent human rights experts focusing on poverty and business and human rights issued their second warning at the Government of Indonesia, the AIIB and AIIB's client, the Indonesian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) to expressly condemn the violations.



III. The Belt and Road Initiative

In 2013, the Chinese government established a Beijing-led global infrastructure development strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under the BRI, Chinese state actors and companies have injected debt and equity financing in nearly 70 countries. The lion's share of this financing is comprised of fossil fuel investments and large-scale infrastructure projects, which have high climate, environmental and social impacts.

The BRI is known for its 'ease of doing business' – and doesn't hold recipients of financing to binding conditions on environmental and social standards. BRI deals are often shrouded in secrecy, while decision making processes are often off-limits to the public, including local communities most likely to be impacted by the projects. Just Finance International works with both local and international actors to make sure these investments and projects are held to better transparency and accountability standards.

Measured Progress in Bosnia & Herzegovina

In the Western Balkans, where JFI staff members have been involved in campaigns since 2013, the effort to stop the advancement of coal plant construction met with both successes and setbacks. As new coal projects no longer qualify for loans from multilateral development banks under policies that prohibit such financing, a number of EU enlargement candidate countries in the region now have China as their only source of financing.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to 29 China-linked energy and infrastructure projects, including expansion on the 700 MW Ugljevik III coal power plant initiated in 2013. In early 2022, Sunningwell International Limited, one of the companies overseeing the planned project, confirmed that Chinese bank loans would no longer be available to continue the plant. The announcement came in response to an article we published in The Diplomat at the end of 2021, which detailed how China was continuing to finance coal power plants in Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its public commitments. The retreat by Chinese banks from the Ugljevik III plant marked the first instance in which the Chinese government's coal pledge was applied retroactively to a project launched before its formal pronouncement in September 2021, serving as a potential precedent for future action.

The fate of another big energy project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Tuzla 7 lignite plant, was also put in doubt after the country's State Aid Council revoked an earlier decision to guarantee a EUR 614 million loan from China Exim Bank. The State Aid Council's decision, announced in July 2022, came after a 2021 analysis by JFI, which documented multiple serious errors and false assumptions in the Chinese-financed project's environmental impact assessments and feasibility studies. Though the announcement represents a clear victory for blocking the proliferation of coal usage, the impetus for change notably did not come from Chinese actors. Indeed, China Gezhouba Group, the project's leading Chinese SOE contractor, has not shown any signs of withdrawing from the project.



Setbacks in Serbia

Serbia counts 61 ongoing infrastructure and energy projects connected to Chinese entities, by far the most in the Balkans. In 2014, China Exim Bank approved a loan for the Kostolac B3 lignite power plant in Serbia, despite important gaps in project's environmental impact assessment. China Exim Bank's loan of \$608 million loan provided 85% of the total investment. In 2017, the plant installed a desulphurisation system supposed to reduce pollution levels, but it remains non-functional to this day. The Kostolac B3 coal-powered electricity plant is scheduled to go online in September 2023, promising to burn 12 million tons of coal annually from the Drmno mine and inflicting serious, continuous environmental damage.

JFI issued press releases and worked with news outlets in the Balkans to spread awareness and call for the Serbian and Chinese authorities to abandon the project. We continue to monitor developments related to Kostolac B3 and the expansion of Drmno mine. In particular, we are tracking various channels of financial support from European governments that persist in propping up Serbia's coal mining industry.



Bor Citizens' safety in danger when Chinese Zijin triple production in Serbian copper complex (2022)

Chinese Investment in Serbia

Serbia has seen a significant increase of Chinese investment and lending in recent years, coinciding with a gradual yet alarming weakening of legal requirements concerning these financial flows. In a comprehensive legal analysis released in March 2022, JFI partnered with Serbia's Renewables and Environmental Regulatory Institute (RERI) to document the many loopholes for large-scale, Chinese-backed infrastructure investments, driving this rise in the flow of money from China. This has netted an overall negative impact on Serbia's legal system, due most acutely to the following three findings:

- 1. Changes in Serbia's Public Procurement Law weakens transparency and is more open to abuse.
- 2. The Serbian government often declares projects, particularly Chinese investments in polluting industries, to be of national interest so that it can apply laws flexibly.
- 3. Government authorities often attempt to avoid complying with requests for information in whole or part under the Law on Access to Information.

In 2022, we continued to be an outspoken voice on the consequences of greater Chinese investment and influence in China, providing commentary for outlets including the Financial Times, RadioFreeEurope, Dagbladet Information, and others. We also maintained and expanded our tracking and support systems across a number of contested investment sites and project areas.

Zijin copper mine

In 2018, majority ownership of a large-scale copper mining and smelting complex located in the Bor basin, in northeast Serbia, fell into the hands of the Chinese mining company Zijin Copper. Zijin's operations in Serbia are among the biggest copper mining operations in Europe, while copper is Serbia's top export to China.

To date, Zijin is one of the many active, highly polluting Chinese investments in the Western Balkans, operating without the necessary environmental and social due diligence. Since the takeover, residents of nearby villages have had to contend with disruptions to their health, private property, and livelihood. When the wind picks up, they can find their living spaces coated in toxic dust. In March 2022, some villagers issued an open letter calling for the stop of unauthorized construction. We amplified their voices with placements in reputable press outlets, added greater credibility their claims with systematic evidence of the mining complex's many legal violations, and helped to quantify some of the damages and repercussions involved.



Overview of the open pit mine "Krivelj", part of the Bor copper mining complex, in the Serbian town of Bor. Photo: TT (2022)

Team and Board

To accomplish our objectives, JFI relies on a tight-knit and fast-moving team based around the world. Our core team members in 2022 included – but are not limited to:

Wawa Wang Director

Wawa works with civil society actors to improve access to information and decision-making in development finance. She previously worked as a policy advisor and investigative researcher for international and European NGOs and trade entities, and has been a trade and foreign affairs advisor for governments. She is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.

Karianne Ford-Bruning Operations Manager

Karianne holds a bachelor in Dutch law and a Master in International and European Law from the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Working in senior management support, as a legal advisor and a project manager, she has a wealth of experience in all-round operational support. She has previously interned for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), worked in the Dutch legal field, and for Greenpeace International.

Aleksandar Kovacevic Digital Communications

Aleksandar created visual work for a number of clients in the apparel, theatre, movie, music and NGO field. Strong eye for all things visual, he brings a unique point of view to visual side of Just Finance. His intention is to support Just Finance team mates reach their goals in communicating pressing stories in the best possible way.

Boris Mrkela Campaigner

Boris has worked as an investigative reporter looking into energy transition, transnational defence deals and surveillance in the age of AI. He previously worked for Bosnia's premier investigative news site where he reported on corruption involving senior government officials, transnational tax evasion and cash-in-transit heists. Nils Resare Senior Researcher

Nils is an investigative reporter, editor and author, working mainly in international development, trade and security policy. He has reported for the Swedish media from four continents since the mid- 1990s, and has done in-depth research into cross-border corruption in Africa, the Balkans and Scandinavia.

Sara Sudetic Senior Campaigner

Sara has extensive field and policy experience working to support communities affected by human rights abuses and land confiscations. She has worked with civil society organisations in Asia and Europe to build local research and advocacy capacity. She was a foreign policy legislative fellow in the United States Congress.

Daniel Ekman Head of Information Security

Daniel is responsible for information security for a number of organizations ranging from NGOs to global businesses. His training comes from the Swedish government as well as the KTH Royal Institute of Technology. In 2022 we were supported by a team of physical security and community outreach specialists and legal counsel in various countries. We thank them for their support.

This past year saw a change on our board as Daniel Simons, Senior Legal Counsel in Greenpeace International's Legal Unit, stepped down. JFI was founded in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, and Daniel was kind enough to serve as one of our three founding board members. As the pandemic has wound down and things have normalized, we are pleased to appoint Carin Norberg in his place. Our new board comprises:

Henrik Alffram Chairperson

Henrik Alfram is a lawyer and sociologist by training with more than 25 years' professional experience centred on human rights, rule of law and governance. As a founder of Rightshouse, he specializes in design, monitoring and evaluation of development interventions. Henrik has worked on such initiatives for development cooperation agencies, international organizations, NGOs and human rights groups in more than 30 countries on five continents. He has previously worked for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and the Faculty of Law at Lund University.

Carin Norberg Secretary

Carin Norberg is a former Director of the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden (2006-2012). Between 1971 and 2002 she was a staff member of the Swedish International Development Authority in various positions and most recent Director of the Department for Democracy and Social Development. She has been based in Zambia and Angola. In the eighties she was engaged as Advisor to the Commissioner for Namibia in New York. She has been working at the Transparency International Secretariat in Berlin. Carin holds a degree in economics and political science from Uppsala University, and has been a member of several boards including Transparency International Sweden, Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies, Civil Rights Defenders and Center for Economic and Social Rights (chair) New York. Rune Steenberg Reyhé Treasurer

Dr. Steenberg Rune is an anthropologist who focusses on Xinjiang and Uyghurs. Extended fieldwork in Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan and earlier in mainland China and Indonesia. Fluent in Uyghur and Chinese, functional communication in Kyrgyz.

Daniel Simons Former founding board member

Daniel Simons is Senior Legal Counsel in Greenpeace International's Legal Unit, where he advises on the risks of protest actions, investigations and publications and handles incoming litigations. His other experience includes working as a legal officer at Article 19, the global campaign for freedom of expression, and as legal officer freedom of assembly, expression and information at the Open Society Justice Initiative. Daniel holds degrees in law from the University of Amsterdam and Columbia University. He has been a member of the Bar of New York since 2005 and serves on the Board of Directors of the Arena for Journalism in Europe and the Article 20 Network.